Light blogging thru the holidays. Enjoy yourselves!
Archive for 2008
Could Blago Do A Little Side-Step?
In Impeachments on December 18, 2008 at 6:36 pmNot strictly legislative law today, but it’s close.
The Associated Press is quoting defense counsel for embattled Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich as saying that the governor will not appoint anyone to the U.S. Senate seat left vacant by President-elect Barack Obama. The governor’s spokesman neither confirmed nor denied that was the governor’s present intention. And the idea of taking the appointment from the governor and instead punting to a special election seems dead, since the Illinois Senate cancelled a vote on the idea and then adjourned.
The status for now is that the governor will not make an appointment, he has not yet been impeached, and there is no clear path to passing legislation for a special election. So how does Illinois get a new U.S. Senator by January?
Blago does the little side-step, temporarily.
The Illinois Constitution contains a mechanism to permit Blagojevich to temporarily step aside, permit the Lieutenant Governor to make the appointment, and then resume his office. “Whenever the Governor determines that he may be seriously impeded in the exercise of his powers, he shall so notify the Secretary of State and the officer next in line of succession. The latter shall thereafter become Acting Governor with the duties and powers of Governor. When the Governor is prepared to resume office, he shall do so by notifying the Secretary of State and the Acting Governor.” Ill. Const. art. V, § 6(c).
This procedure has apparently never been used. See Calvin Bellamy, Presidential Disability: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Still an Untried Tool, 9 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 373, 387, 396-397 (2000). But that doesn’t mean it couldn’t be tried, especially under these circumstances where his pre-appointment actions are alleged to be criminal. Obama has already resigned, and Illinois currently only has one vote in the U.S. Senate. Use of this constitutional “side-step” provision would permit the vacancy to be filled now, while removing the appearance of any impropriety in the appointment process. And since Illinois Lieut. Gov. Pat Quinn and Blagojevich don’t exactly see eye-to-eye now (if they ever did), it seems that Quinn’s appointment would not be seen as delivering on any promises allegedly extracted by Blagojevich from prospective candidates.
There is a third way to resolve this crisis, if the principal figure decides he wants to. Time will tell.
If Invited, You May Want to Testify
In Legislative Procedure on December 17, 2008 at 4:46 pm**Update below.**
The financial management of the Pedernales Electric Cooperative has been the focus of countless newspaper articles, legislative hearings and at least one lawsuit. The Austin American-Stateman reported today on the release of a 390-page report by an outside consultant that “offered a sweeping indictment . . . of the utility’s old regime and a critical portrayal of former General Manager Bennie Fuelberg while raising new questions about past actions by former executives and insiders.”
Senate Business & Commerce Chairman Troy Fraser, the cooperative’s chief legislative critic, told the paper that “[n]ow it’s time to put people under oath.”
Now, the paper didn’t say, and the Horseshoe Bay Republican didn’t elaborate on, who would be administering the oath or in what forum. Let’s assume, however, that the Senator meant that he would be calling those “former executives and insiders” to testify under oath before his committee. And although the paper didn’t say so, it earlier reported on the pending criminal investigation. So, let’s assume for a moment that a parade of coop executives and insiders are called before the committee next year.
Friendly advice to those called: You might want to show up, assert that what you are about to say will incriminate you, and tell all.
Why? Because Texas law provides that you cannot be “indicted or prosecuted for any transaction, matter, or thing about which the person truthfully testified or produced evidence.” Tex. Govt. Code § 301.025(c). The privilege is absolute; it applies regardless of whether the witness testified under subpena or voluntarily. Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. M-206 at 2 (1968). A witness must answer truthfully and responsively for the immunity to apply. Id.
This privilege is provided because “[a] witness called . . . by a legislative committee does not have a privilege to refuse to testify to a fact” by asserting the witness’s Constitutional rights against self-incrimination. See Tex. Govt. Code § 301.025(a). The only way the Legislature can take away those rights is by providing the absolute immunity from criminal proceedings. Ferrantello v. State, 256 S.W.2d 587, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
The statute makes sense because it permits adequate inquiry by the legislature by removing the self-incrimination obstacle. Consider allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, such as failing to refrain from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge that a prosecutor knew was not supported by probable cause or other conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation or otherwise constituting obstruction of justice. A witness must be able to testify fully and freely about the prosecutor’s actions without worrying that the prosecutor would attempt to imidate him with prosecution on trumped-up charges.
Perhaps this seems like letting a wrong-doer off easy, and that will surely be the result at least once, and might be the result here. However, the Legislature can often act much faster than the courts or even the Executive branch. As the branch closest to the people and directly responsible to them like none other (even considering our elective plural executive or our elective judiciary), the Legislature is in an unique position to remedy the situation at the coop. Since legislative changes to the coop’s governance and operations are needed, the Legislature needs a full record of the misdeeds and wrongdoing in order to craft its enactments accordingly. The absolute immunity thus aids the Legislature in providing quick, effective relief to citizens. For that, the tradeoff is worth it.
UPDATE: A reader asks some good questions I will briefly answer. The first question is “Do you have to be called to testify to be covered by the privilege?” The answer is no, you do not have to be called by the committee; your presence may be voluntary and the privilege applies. The second question is “What if you just sign up as a witness,and start blabbing the truth after saying what you’re about to say possibly will incriminate you, do you get immunity?” Probably not, since the incriminating testimony needs to be in response to a question by a committee member that is relevant to the proceedings. For example, I don’t think immunity applies to a person confessing to a murder when appearing before House Ways & Means to discuss the franchise tax. The third question is “Has a legislator ever called a witness explicitly so that the witness can get immunity (in an effort to help that person avoid prosecution)?” While this is almost like trying to prove a negative, I do not have any notes where someone has made this allegation.
Madam President?
In Legislative Procedure on October 22, 2008 at 2:29 pmThe Boston Globe notes GOP vice presidental nominee Sarah Palin’s response to a second grader’s question about the duties of job she seeks: “But also, they’re in charge of the United States Senate, so if they want to, they can really get in there with the senators and make a lot of good policy changes that will make life better for Brandon and his family and his classroom. And it’s a great job and I look forward to having that job.”
While technically the vice president could function as the Senate’s equivalent of the Speaker of the House and exert major influence over legislation and policymaking, senators would have to grant her that power. And historically, senators have refused to do it.
For example, the Vice President generally has no independent right to address the Senate from the chair absent unanimous consent or other indulgence of the Senate. Riddick, Senate Procedure at 1390, 1391-1392. It is true that the Vice President has made “long statements from the chair” in the past. Id. at 1391. An examination of those precedents show that the statements were made by Vice President Alben Barkley, who was held in high esteem by his colleagues since his days as Senate leader under Roosevelt. The seminal episode demonstrating this came during World War II when he famously resigned his post as leader because he could not support FDR’s veto of a tax bill. After he voted with his colleagues to override the veto, they re-elected him as leader. There may be other times when the Vice President spoke at length of the chair, but I cannot readily locate them in the Senate’s published precedents.
Unlike Tom Craddick, Palin could not attempt to control debate by refusing recognition because the Senate Rules require the Vice President to recognize the first Senator who asks the chair for recognition. U.S. Sen. R. XIX § 1(a) (providing that “[w]hen a Senator desires to speak, he shall rise and address the Presiding Officer, and shall not proceed until he is recognized, and the Presiding Officer shall recognize the Senator who shall first address him“) (emphasis added.)
Further, Palin cannot exert control over policymaking because she has no role in appointing the Senate committees that have the greatest control over shaping policy thru legislation — the Senate itself appoints committees and committee chairs by a resolution embodying the selections of the majority and minority party caucuses. See id. at R. XXIV § 1.
Finally, I would note that Lyndon Johnson, who went from powerful majority leader to figurehead vice president, asked his former colleagues to allow him to be the “permanent presiding officer” of the Senate Democratic Caucus in 1961 in an attempt to keep operating as a “super-leader.” The request was approved by less than unanimous consent after bitter debate showing that the senators didn’t like the idea and Johnson gave up trying to lead the Senate as vice president.
If Lyndon couldn’t do it, I doubt Sarah can.
“On Line 5, strike . . .”
In Legislative Drafting on September 27, 2008 at 9:54 amSeems there might be some drafting problems with Senate Banking Chairman Christopher Dodd’s bailout bill, according to Jim Lundgren at Volokh Conspiracy.
And For All of You Lawyers…
In Legislative Lawyering on September 18, 2008 at 9:55 pmThe Legal Profession Blog is reporting two recent developments involving bar discipline of lawyers who held public positions. In the first case, a former state senator with “a felony conviction for misconduct in office and being party to campaign contributions in excess of the legal limits” was reinstated as a member of the Wisconsin Bar after serving a two year suspension. In the second case, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission is seeking to discipline a lawyer who served as a non-lawyer municipal official in Chicago. In her municipal offices, the lawyer was responsible for hiring and promoting employees. She allegedly met with the city’s government relations office to receive lists of persons politically connected to City Hall and then bent the city’s civil service system to ensure those with political juice were hired. This politically sensitive hiring ran afoul of a Federal court consent decree barring patronage employment.
Doing One’s Duty
In Legislative Responsibility on September 15, 2008 at 1:08 pmAdded to my stack of reading: Unenumerated Duties, a new article by Professor Robin L. West (Georgetown University Law Center discussing the nature of a legislator’s duty to legislate for the public good, whether that duty matters, and how to deal with breaches of that duty. Recommended by Legal Theory Blog.
Lund on Legislative Prayer
In Legislative Procedure on August 20, 2008 at 5:04 pmProfessor Christopher Lund of Mississippi College of Law has posted a draft article discussing the history of Congressional chaplains. As Professor Lund notes, this is important because the Supreme Court used the history of prayers in Congress to justify the use of prayer by state legislatures. Another printout for the ever-growing read pile.
Tempus in a Teapot?
In Legislative Procedure on August 5, 2008 at 3:04 pmA Kentucky trial judge has invalidated a highway construction bill because the Legislature did not get the bill to the Governor until the day after it was constitutionally required to adjourn sine die. Under a time-honored tradition in Kentucky (and, at least, Texas), the Legislature stopped the clock before midnight on April 15, the session’s last day, and then proceeded to pass several bills, including the road bill. However, the judge did not rely on the stopped clock to invalidate the bill.
The judge instead looked to the fact that the bill was not presented to the Governor for his signature until April 16, a day on which the Legislature was not in session. Since the Legislature could not legally be in session, a presiding officer could not sign an enrolled bill and a legislative officer could not present the bill to the Governor for his consideration. Thus, the time for getting it to the Governor’s desk just ran out. At least 11 other bills and five resolutions are also subject to invalidation under the judge’s decision, according to the Louisville Courier-Journal, “includ[ing] some key measures, including a House bill aimed at energy conservation, a broad criminal justice bill and the authorization of local water and sewer projects.” No word yet on any appeal. Williams v. Grayson, No. 08-CI-856 (Ky. Circ. Franklin Co. July 31, 2008) (opinion available here). [Thanks to the Kentucky Law Review for posting the initial stories.]
Recess
In Admin on July 30, 2008 at 6:55 pmLight posting this week because of other commitments, but I’m working on a post for week’s end. Stay tuned.
In Whose Name We Pray
In Legislative Procedure on July 23, 2008 at 7:13 pmThe Fourth Circuit (O’Connor, Assoc. J., sitting by designation) has issued a decision (PDF) upholding the Fredericksburg (Va.) City Council’s practice of opening each meeting with a non-denominational prayer made by a member. Nothing earth shattering in the opinion, which relies on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) and its own decision in Simpson v. Chesterfield Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
Today’s Episode on Resignations
In Legislative Privilege on July 23, 2008 at 11:53 amJosh Chafetz, guest-blogging at The Volokh Conspiracy, continues his series on the constitutionality of resignations by members of the U.S. House of Representatives with this post. UPDATE: And part V is here. ANOTHER UPDATE: Chafetz responds to commentors today.
Resignations: Yes for Nixon, No for Pelosi?
In Legislative Privilege on July 22, 2008 at 3:53 pmJosh Chafetz, guest-blogging at The Volokh Conspiracy, has three separate posts on whether the Constitution permits Representatives in Congress to resign their seats. Looks like my stack of law review articles to read has justs grown. (Apparently he’s a smart fellow from Houston whose dad teaches at U. of H. Just because he’s from Texas does not move his article to the top of the list, though.)
Speech and Debate in “Bonusgate”
In Legislative Privilege on July 22, 2008 at 3:40 pmEdward Still at Votelaw has a brief item this morning pointing out this story on Pennsylvania’s “bonusgate” that details how e-mails between House employees are being used to prove the prosecution’s case, including obtaining the indictments. (The prosecution’s press release includes links to the grand jury reports). While the candor expressed in the e-mails is both startling and disturbing in their honesty, I am wondering about the part legislative privilege might play once the case goes to trial if the defense tries to suppress some of the e-mail evidence.
You see, the incriminating e-mails were obtained by “[Attorney General Tom] Corbett’s agents [who] combed through thousands of e-mails between staffers, lawmakers and others within the legislative branch.” How did the AG obtain “thousands of e-mails” without implicating the state’s constitutions speech and debate clause?
In Pennsylvania, legislators, “for any speech or debate in either House[,] they shall not be questioned in any other place.” Pa. Const. art. II, sec. 15. This protection extends to records concerning “activity [that is] an integral part of the deliberative and communicative process by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.” Parsons v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 910 A.2d 177, 187 (Pa. Cmmw. 2006) (emphasis added). Both Houses have constitutional authority to “ prescribe by law the number, duties and compensation of the officers and employees of each House[.]” Pa. Const. art. III, sec. 17.
This issue was discussed by the D.C. Circuit in its opinion in the William Jefferson case, where the FBI conducted a full search of a congressional office in the Rayburn House Office Building. The D.C. Circuit agreed with Jefferson’s argument that the mere review of legislative documents implicates the Federal Speech and Debate clause because, to determine which documents were covered by the search warrant, the FBI had to review documents that certainly related to legislative acts of the legislator. And while mere copying of electronic material was permissible, that material could not be reviewed until the legislator had a chance to assert his privilege under the clause.
Jefferson’s case involved looking for records related to Jefferson’s personal business interests that, it was alleged, Jefferson was advancing through his office as a representative. In Pennsylvania, the case relates directly to the management and control of legislative employees, a wholly legislative act within the jurisdiction of the House and thus one designed to be protected by the state’s speech and debate clause. This appears to me to be a distinction with a difference. The indictment does seems to reflect this understanding because it alleges that the conduct furthered the private gain of seeking and obtaining elected office.
I’m not surely exactly how this would play out in the criminal trial on a motion to suppress. The Jefferson court seemed to suggest that the remedy was some kind of exclusion based on the Fourth Amendment once an indictment is handed down. I confess that I haven’t looked at this issue at all. If someone else has, I’d appreciate hearing their thoughts.
Of course, I am not advocating that criminal activity by legislators should be privileged or unreviewable. I am merely saying that there should be some safeguards to allow legislators to fully and freely do the jobs they were elected to do without fear of having the AG or the Governor looking over their shoulder the whole time. As special safeguards above and beyond warrants [that] should apply when there is a particularly high risk that various papers will implicate confidential information of innocent third parties—as is likely when a newspaper office is searched, or an attorney’s office, or a priest’s office. I suggested that such searches should be conducted by special judicial masters or magistrates, who would prevent roving executive eyes from snooping into papers that are irrelevant to the investigation at hand.” Since the purpose of speech and debate clauses is to ensure the legislature’s independence free from harassment by the executive and judicial branches, it would seem that there should have been in place some safeguard before the Pennsylvania Attorney General rifled thru thousands of e-mails between legislators, their staff and constituents. Anyone who has worked in a legislative office understands the needs for privileged communication, especially with constituents who disclose personal information. This is definitely one to watch.
Call to Order
In Admin on July 5, 2008 at 11:45 amI decided to start this blawg as my own “ice-axe to break the frozen sea within [me].” I have been toying with the idea of starting this blawg for some time, but hesitated each time because I thought that, quite possibly, that I really didn’t have much to say after all. I’ve decided that the only way to find out is to simply begin.
You might well ask “what is ‘legislative law?’” I use “legislative law” to refer to several related concepts. First, it refers to the “discipline [formulated by Georgetown Law Prof. Chai Feldblum] of combining knowledge of political realities with a thorough understanding of legal issues — to [let the lawyer] develop legislation that effectively meets one’s goals and still has a realistic chance of passage, or to stop or modify legislation that is antithetical to one’s goals.” It also refers to that part of the law concerned with legislative bodies (including their election and composition) and the legislative process. It also refers to that part of the law concerned with working with the product of legislative bodies, popularly known as statutory construction. It isn’t primarily about lobbying or lobbyists, although it does address the legal regulation of those who lobby Federal, state, and local legislative bodies.
A legislative lawyer is a lawyer that straddles “the vast difference[s] between law in the books and law in action.” See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Forward to Vol. 1, 1 Tex. L. & Legis. 1 (1947).