Hugh Brady's

The Not-So-Large House

In Legislative Structure on July 12, 2010 at 2:28 pm

Richard Winger reports that “a 3-judge U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Mississippi ruled that the U.S. Constitution does not require a larger number of members in the U.S. House of Representatives.” The court rejected arguments that the current statutory limit of 435 representatives “provides great inequality between states. [For example,] Wyoming has one seat for 495,304 persons, but Montana has one seat for 905,316 persons.  Therefore, an individual voter in Wyoming has more than twice the voting power of a voter in Montana, for U.S. House representation.” The case is Clemons v U.S. Department of Commerce, and the post has a link to the full opinion.

Kagan: Legislation is Legislature’s Job

In Statutory Construction on July 2, 2010 at 2:15 pm

Well, no real surprise here: Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan thinks that the Congress ought to make laws. As reported by the New York Times, Kagan, currently Solicitor General, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that Congress had a duty to pass reasonable and constitutional laws and shouldn’t rely on the Supreme Court to “strike down laws that they think are senseless, just because they’re senseless.” Her comments came in response to a question by Oklahoma Republican Tom Coburn who asked if the Congress could enact a law requiring Americans “to eat three vegetables and three fruits every day.” As the Times notes, Coburn’s question “was, of course, a transparent proxy for the recent health care legislation, and Ms. Kagan knew that.”

However, as James Oliphant writes, “[t]o Kagan, at first blush, the question must have seemed absurd, maybe even a joke. ‘It sounds like a dumb law,’ she replied off the cuff. Then, realizing Coburn was serious, she segued into sort of the windy, contextual, cautious analysis that she has employed to answer most of the questions asked of her over the last two days. But she had fallen into Coburn’s trap by answering more like the law professor she is than by simply responding like most people would. She never just said: ‘Of course it can’t.’”

Of course, as better explained by scholars such as William Popkin, a court does legislate when it undertakes discretionary judging — that is, when it undertakes, as it must, the task of fitting statutes into “their past and future.” And this “modest competence” aids, rather than retards, “good government.” Instead of offering insipid answers, why can’t Kagan, the former dean of Harvard Law School, give an honest answer that accounts for this? Especially when she herself decried the confirmation kabuki dance?

Justices Who Like Looking Over the Crowd

In Uncategorized on December 16, 2009 at 3:50 pm

At The Conglomerate today, David Zaring, an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at Wharton School of Business,  posts a table showing which U.S. Supreme Court Justices are/have been the heaviest users of legislative history in determining the meaning of statutory language. The graphic isn’t very good, but you can dope out most of it. The post also contains a link to his paper, co-authored with David Law, Professor of Law and of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis.